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F orce Versus Food

Introduction

The division of the world into "developed" and "underdeveloped" areas is a commonplace of post-war political journalism.
The result has been that the intelligent reader of the daily pressin Paris, Karachi, Djakarta, or Washington-has little choice but
to equate economic development with the much narrower concept
of technological achievement. Factories and mines, railway and
telegraph networks, mechanized agriculture-all these are taken
as the standards of a "developed" economy. Conversely, the term
"under-developed" suggests the peasant household, rudimentary
communications, depressed per capita income, and unsatisfactory
public hygiene-all of which contribute to a "low" standard of
living.
These notions, sweeping and arbitrary though they are, have
gained wide acceptance. They have helped to shape the emotional
and intellectual climate in which modern statesmen, journalists, educators, and the great mass of humanity all work and live.
But frequently the result of such schematic thinking on the problems of the world's economies have been unfortunate and productive
of misunderstanding. In the West, these concepts have sometimes led
to a complacency which might easily be, and in fact has been, interpreted elsewhere as an unfeeling arrogance. In some regions of Asia
and Africa, on the other hand, an honestly derived sense of deprivation and poverty has been converted into an uncritical hostility
toward the highly industrialized West and used to further zenopho-
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bic tendencies and extremist movements which grasp at unrealistic
and "patent" solutions to the all too real problems of so-called underdeveloped economies. Finally, the experience of the past decade
suggests that the concept of economic development has been employed
as a political and ideological weapon by a number of Communist
countries, in an effort to advertize the advantages of their own
planned economies and in a parallel attempt to foster diplomatic and
commercial alignments.
From all this it is fair to conclude that the concept of economic
development needs more precise definition if it is to be employed
intelligently. And the very first thing that needs saying is that the
economic development of a country involves a great deal more than
the relatively obvious presence of heavy industry and mechanical
equipment. In the final analysis, it is not the availability of industrial
equipment alone which determines the degree of economic development or the standard of living, but rather how a people lives. In other
words, one must first ask whether a nation suffers want, if so of what
kind, and to what manner of use its available resources are put.
To realize this point, one need only note that several Asian and
African countries are considered under-developed not only because
they suffer from a shortage of industrial equipment but also because
they are victims of malnutrition and recurrent famine. It is certainly
true that such countries need industrialization: that they require railways and motor transport, cement factories, and electric generating
stations. But it is equally important to inquire into the diverse purposes which these products of modern technology are intended to
serve. It is certainly undeniable that any country, particularly one
which is primarily agrarian, will take pride in the construction of an
important rail or road network, or in the erection of a plant capable of
producing machine tools.
Yet, for an economist, a complex machine is not of itself an index
of economic development. The use to which the machine is put is
crucial. If a diesel locomotive is employed only to transport munitions, to move bodies of troops, or to fetch the raw materials necessary
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for the construction of yet more locomotives, it is doubtful that it
contributes significantly to economic development. But if its use is so
diversified as to include the carrying of produce to market and finished products to agrarian centers, if the raw materials which are
necessary for its construction have not been obtained at the expense of
plows and irrigation equipment, if the real income of the community
which it serves is sufficient to make travel and the exchange of goods
both possible and advantageous, then this particular machine does
contribute to economic growth and well-being.
All this means that "industrialization" cannot be viewed as an
end in itself if the real goal is the genuine economic development of a
country or territory, Economic development is not necessarily synonymous with industrialization; it really refers to the balanced growth of
a nation's economy, and hence to the sensible use of its available
resources.
The present study may perhaps serve to illustrate this point in
some detail. In examining the development of Communist agricultural institutions over a period of four decades, it raises some questions
and suggests a number of lessons which, if not entirely new or original, may still be useful and interesting to the general reader, irrespective of his national allegiance or place of residence.
No one, of course, can seriously doubt that the Soviet Union, and
at least some of its East European dependencies, have attained a
degree of industrialization which enables them to produce capital
goods and a variety of scientific and mechanical equipment in substantial quantities. Similarly, most informed observers would acknowledge that some Communist countries-and the Soviet Union in
particular-have shown themselves capable of offering the products
of their domestic industry in the international market. And certainly
they have succeeded in building, and maintaining, one of the largest
and most formidable military arsenals in existence.
The relative speed of these achievements has attracted considerable
attention and comment, even among those observers who are aware
of the staggering human and political price which the Communists
3

have had to pay. In recent years especially, a tendency has developed among some non-European commentators to display a
marked degree of interest in the adaptability of Soviet solutions
to the problems of their own economies.
On the whole, the sources of this interest are comprehensible.
Essentially they derive from an urgent desire to "catch up," and
from a deeply felt need for self-assertion, as '\-vell as from a rather
less tenable tendency to equate independence with self-sufficiency.
But when this much is said, it can still be argued with cause that
such interest arises from a misunderstanding which, in the final
anal ysis, derives from the attempt to equate industrialization for
its own sake with sound national economic development.
Such an equation simply cannot be sustained in practice. If
the goal of organized national economic activity is to advance
the welfare of the people, then it follows that the chief problem
in any modern community is to aid those elements in the population with the smallest real income. And in all but perhaps a halfdozen countries of the world that means devoting primary attention
to the peasant-whether he is engaged in the production of rice,
wheat, millet, or maize. There is no inference that this process can
be accomplished without industrialization. Quite obviously it cannot.
In some countries of East and South-East Asia, for instance, one
of the major impediments to sound economic development-which
can only be overcome by a systematic program of industrialization
-lies in rural overpopulation. Clearly, this is a problem not susceptible of solution merely by fostering an increase in the productivity
of agriculture. That might only result in agricultural under-employment, and the real solution would still lie in the transfer of population from the land to a variety of urban and industrial occupations.
Similarly, it may be considered axiomatic that one of the fundamental requirements of any "under-developed" economy must be
the increase of the national income. And the latter would be almost
impossible of accomplishment without some measure of industrialization and without the resultant accumulations of net profit to the
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community, over and above its total consumption in the form of
goods and services.
Yet, the fact that industrialization per se is not and can never
be the simple panacea which some have tended to make it remains
true. For the under-developed countries, the road to sound economic
development still lies in a consciously planned attempt to harmonize
and coordinate agrarian and industrial growth.

It is a matter of record that in some parts of the world the goal
of industrialization was less transformation of the economic and
social level of the masses than the desire to achieve military superiority over one's neighbors, or else to attain an absolute degree of
economic self-sufficiency, because this seemed desirable from a
political standpoint and feasible in terms of the availability of basic
raw materials. Indeed, industrialization has been undertaken by a
number of Communist states for a combination of both reasons,
as well as in an attempt to realize in practice the substance of
an arbitrary and dogmatic ideology.
To the highly interdependent contemporary \vorld which has
now entered the era of atomic technology and may use this technology in peace or war, these are reasons for industrialization
which, while they may be comprehensible, do not seem to be very
sound. The recent past shows that, whether in the case of Nazi
Germany, Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan, or "People's Democratic
Hungary," the price paid by the populations was exorbitant, and
the results for the world at large have been far from satisfactory.
In effect, each of these motivations for programs of precipitous
industrialization has led to war, totalitarianism, and colonialism.
That they may have brought certain benefits to some small group
is not so significant as the fact that they have never brought as
many benefits for the entire population as a balanced concept of
economic development, however under-developed a particular economy might be.
To illustrate this point in detail, an economist could present
a variety of evidence and case histories in abundance. Yet few of
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these histories are as instructive as the forty-year record of the
U mon of Soviet Socialist Republics and more recently, of its smaller
East European satellites. These histories may seem like dazzling
achievements only to those who do not know them in detail. While
impressive in some respects they are also a chronicle replete with
error, cruelty, and, most damaging for our purposes, economic
malfunctioning. The vital question before us is only whether and
how many of them are really good lessons which are worthwhile
learning and repeating.
The pages which follow do not attempt to prejudge this issue.
They present a simple discussion of Communist agricultural institutions and practices, and as such they constitute a brief inquiry into
the Soviet theory of economic development. Neither here nor elsewhere can a tenable attempt be made to minimize certain aspects
of the Soviet industrial achievement. Yet to repeat, it is legitimate
to question whether that achievement constitutes a real and useful
development of the national economy.

6

Agriculture 'In the Communist
Economic System
In the four decades following the Revolution of 1917 a unique
form of agricultural organization took shape within the Soviet orbit,
reflecting Communist theory regarding the land and the uses to
which it should be put. The four essential features which characterize this system may be summarized as follows:
1. State, or "public," ownership of all land;

2. Cultivation of the land not by individual families or
farmers, but by clusters of many households functioning together in larger units known as "collective" or
" state" f arms;
3. The existence of a state-owned and state-operated
pool of all agricultural machinery, and a centralized
system of crop collection effected through a statewide network of machine tractor stations (MTS);
4. The regular and recurrent imposition of delivery
quotas for all types of agricultural produce on each
of the producing units, at prices determined by the
state in its capacity as the principal purchaser.
As might well be expected of all institutions which are in
process of growth and development, the Soviet and other Communist agricultural systems in Europe and Asia have not remained
wholly static. They have experienced varying degrees of change,
occasioned either by ideological considerations or by the necessity
to adapt the essentials of the system to prevailing economic, po-
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litical, or geographic conditions. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that
the four basic features have always been retained· in recognizable form as characteristic hallmarks of Communist agricultural
organization.
What have been the determining factors which have helped
to shape this specific form of organization? One has certainI y
been Communist policy in general. Another appears to be the stage
of economic development reached by a given country at the time
of the introduction of a Communist system. Both deserve some
further examination.
Informed observers have often noted the curious fact that
neither the Soviet Union nor any other Communist state has
ever developed a coherent or really consistent approach to the
problems of agricultural policy. Instead, agriculture has been
regarded as only one among several instruments to be employed
in the struggle to attain larger political goals, and as an adjunct
to the industrial development schemes of Communist Party planners. In other words, orthodox Communists have always adopted
an essentially ad hoc attitude toward agricultural problems-so
much so that it is almost true to say that they have never been
reall y interested in agricultural policy at all, except as an expression of their program for non-urban populations in general. In
short, orthodox Communists have never wanted to, and therefore
have never succeeded in, differentiating between the peasantry as a
sociological and political entity and agriculture as a form of economic activity. Hence, from the very beginning, the development
of Communist agriculture has been shaped rather more by political than economic considerations and has always been influenced, most decisively, by a deep-rooted distrust of the peasantry
which is inherent in traditional Marxist thought.
The peasant, engaged as he traditionally is in individual production, has always been seen through Communist eyes as a backward stage of development when compared with the modern
factory worker, whose economic activity is essentially of a cooperative nature. Similarly, the peasant's proverbial attachment to his
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land and his innate conservatism have tended to alienate him from
the urban-oriented Communist party whose preoccupation with
the industrial proletariat has usually led it to regard him with dislike
and suspicion. Moreover, the doctrinaire conception of a Communist society is naturally quite incompatible with the continued
existence of a sphere of economic activity dominated by private
property and private enterprise, and therefore characterized by what
the Marxist describes as "pre-capitalist" production relationships.
The combined effect of these antagonisms between Party and
peasantry serves to explain not only the Communist attitude toward
agriculture, but also the long-term ambition of every Communist
regime, which is to transform the peasantry into a rural proletariat,
employed and remunerated on the same terms as the urban worker.
This program has not been, and was not intended to be, realized
all at once. Yet it remains as much of a basic objective today as it
was in the early and turbulent days which followed the Bolshevik
revolution. Expropriation of the land, machine tractor stations,
collective and state farms are still seen by Communist theoreticians
as necessary milestones along the road to the farming city or
.
" agrogorod"
Apart from these socio-political and rather theoretical considerations, Soviet agricultural policy has also been shaped by the rather
immediate determination of the Soviet leaders to make reality conform to theory by forcibly transforming the USSR into an industrialized state.
The Bolsheviks had, after all, triumphed in a country which,
quite contrary to orthodox Marxist theory, was not highly industrialized and which could not boast of a powerful or numerous
urban proletariat. In Leninist terms, therefore, it lacked the major
prerequisites for the construction of a socialist state and for the
establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat as conceived in
Communist ideology. Moreover, these doctrinal considerations
were given added urgency in the eyes of the early Soviet government because of their experiences during the period of civil war
and foreign intervention which followed close on the heels of the
9

October Revolution. The Bolsheviks saw in these events not only
their own weakness, but also ample evidence of the hostility felt
toward them by the rest of the world. Industrialization therefore
seemed imperative to them on both purely practical and on theoretical grounds.
The implications of this decision for Soviet agriculture were
momentous and far-reaching. Once made, it committed the Soviet
government to a ruthless search for the two essential ingredients
of industrialization-capital and manpower. Unable or unwilling
to obtain foreign investments or technical aid, the Soviets determined to finance their program of industrial expansion from domestic resources alone. And this in practical terms meant that it
would be financed from agriculture, as the only available resource.
Similarly, the search for manpower could only be realized in
con junction with the establishment of agricultural institutions
which could guarantee that a substantial portion of the rural population vlould be forced to migrate from the land into the city
and the factory.
The result has been that, for almost four decades, Soviet rural
policy-if indeed one can call it a policy-has been directed not
only, or even primarily, toward the maintenance or improvement
of agricultural production, but toward the achievement of certain
social and ideological aims on the one hand and the accumulation
of capital for an industrialization program on the other.
If, however, orthodox Communism has been influenced in its
attitude toward agriculture by a profound distrust of the peasant,
as well as by its overwhelming desire to find security and reassurance through an industrialization program, even in the years
following the second \V orId War it has also had to reckon with the
degree of economic development reached by a given country at
the time of the Communist assumption of power. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and the so-called German Democratic Republic, all members of the Soviet orbit, including the Soviet Union
itself, were primarily agricultural. The bulk of their populations
were engaged in tilling the land, and by far the largest part of the
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national product originated in agriculture. All of the countries in
question, of course, had some industrial potential, but as in the
case of Czarist Russia, so in that of the People's Democracies of
Eastern Europe-their industries tended to lag behind this potential. They could, therefore, be considered economically retarded,
at least so far as they displayed one of the classic features of
so-called economic "backwardness" in the form of agricultural
under-employment.
The presence of more people on the land than necessary to
raise the crop which the soil is capable of yielding acted as an
added incentive for the Soviet and the later satellite industrialization drives. It appeared to provide an economically justifiable reason
for instigating a transfer of population which, in turn, had the
added advantage of helping to solve the ideologically significant
"peasant problem."
In the light of this discussion, it should now be clear that
agriculture, as a national industry vital to any country-whether
large or small-has suffered systematic neglect in all parts of the
Communist world over a period of four decades. First within the
Soviet Union, and presently in the other states of the Communist
orbit, agriculture was relegated to a secondary role for a combination
of ideological, political, and economic reasons. The result has been
the development of more than a half-dozen national economies
remarkable for their imbalance and distinguished by their recurrent
need for emergency drives designed to bolster an inadequate and
unstable agricultural output. Even though their industrialization
drives have achieved a relative measure of success, the Soviet and
other Communist governments have failed to institute a really basic
improvement in their agricultural structure. Although perhaps in
a somewhat modified sense, it still remains true that Communist
policy is less interested in helping to secure a permanent improvement in agricultural production than it is in achieving certain
other aims to which purely agricultural considerations must remain
subordinate. A brief account of the evolution of agricultural Institutions in the Soviet Union will help to illustrate this point.
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The Development of Soviet
Agricultural Institutions
The development of Soviet agricultural institutions over a period
of forty years can be divided into several fairly distinct periods,
each with certain characteristic features.
The first of these phases is that of "War Communism," or
the period covering the civil war and its immediate aftermath,
from late 1917 to early 1921. Essentially this was a time of complete economic chaos, in industry as well as agriculture.
The Bolsheviks, drawing their principal support from the urban
proletariat, had relatively few followers among the peasants. While
they had been among the few political groups to give their emphatic blessing to the expropriation of landed estates without compensation by the peasants since the spring of 1917, their equivocal
position on private land ownership and distribution had failed
to gain them much influence in the countryside. The party which
did have by far the largest following in the rural areas was that of the
left-wing Social Revolutionaries. Consequently, in order to gain
the support of the peasants, the Bolsheviks in their Land Decree
of November 1917 in effect adopted the policy platform of the
Social Revolutionaries, expropriating the large estates and distributing the land to "those who tilled it."
F or reasons which have already been noted, the Bolsheviks
did not, however, intend to organize agriculture along the lines
advocated by the Social Revolutionaries, as promised by their own
propagandists. The Land Decree of February 1918, although restating the general lines of the November decree, already mentioned
12

the desirability of promoting a "collective economy in agriculture
. . . with a view to a later transition to socialistic agriculture."
At the time this meant little in practice. The land hunger of
the Russian peasants was so great that they divided the large
estates once held by the aristocracy and the monasteries with
little regard for the specific wording of any decree. The division
of land proceeded spontaneously, and would no doubt have taken
place whether the Bolsheviks-or any other government-had approved it or not. Even though these estates may have been viewed
as the only practical or even possible nuclei for the formation of
collective or state farms, the whole question of the socialization of
the countryside had nevertheless to remain academic during these
early stages. In 1917 and early 1918 political considerations in any
event dictated quite another course. Above all else the Bolsheviks
needed to win the support of the peasantry and to find a means
of raising the output of food. The job of changing the social structure of the countryside would have to wait.
This initial caution in the Soviet dealings with the peasantry
was, of course, only a counsel of expediency-not a matter of conviction. Having seized power for the first time the Bolsheviks
found themselves in a precarious situation. They did not control
large sections of the country, and they faced political disorder
in those which they did control. Industrial production had come
to a virtual standstill, currency inflation had reached runaway
proportions, and the peasants had no incentive to bring their
surpluses to market. The Ukraine, at that time the "breadbasket"
of all Russia, was to remain a confused battlefield for years, and
this, of course, made the problem of feeding the urban proletariat
and the rapidly growing Red Army ever more acute. Under such
circumstances initial caution soon gave way to what seemed to be
the only possible solution-coercion. By recruiting and dispatching
small groups of so-called committees of "poor peasants" from the
countryside and organizing well-armed "food detachments of
workers and poor peasants" from the cities, the Communist government in effect began to requisition all surplus produce from the
13

peasantry and, driven by almost desperate need, usually exacted a
great deal more than actual "surplus." Perhaps the best summary
of this program was given by Lenin himself:
The peculiarity of War Communism consisted in the fact that
we really took from the peasants all their surpluses, and sometimes even what was not surplus but part of what was necessary to feed the peasant, took it to cover the costs of the army
and to maintain the workers. We took it for the most part on
credit, for paper money. . . .:11<

The consequences of such a policy could well be anticipated.
Not only did the peasants attempt to hide their surpluses (which
was often difficult because of the existence of the "committees of
poor peasants"), but they also began to curtail their output. Accordingly, in the short period of two years-which were characterized not only by civil war, general economic chaos, and the
peasant resistance which became a widespread response to forced
requisitions-an almost total collapse of agricultural production
ensued. In late 1920 the sown acreage in the Soviet Union had
fallen to . almost a quarter of the pre-war figure, and food production suffered accordingly.
With the end of military operations against the dissident
"White" armies, peasant resistance increased, particularly as the
danger of actual fighting ended and as famine began to develop
not only in urban but in rural areas as well. Peasant opposition
took the form of local uprisings and eventually culminated in the
armed insurrection of the sailors of the Red Fleet at Kronstadt. The
sailors' demands reflected not only their own wishes but also those
of the peasantry, and were the more serious since the Baltic Fleet
had been one of the first and best units of the Bolshevik forces.
Only then did it become obvious to the Soviet government that
the policies of the past three years were unworkable. It was no
longer any use attempting to extract, by force or persuasion, farm
:II<

Lenin, Sochineniia, voL XXVI.
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The peasantry owned about half of Russia's farm land in 1914, and seized the rest during the revolutionary upheaval of 1917.
The Bolsheviks first encouraged these seizures. Once in power, they nationalized the land and introduced collectivization.

Peasant resistance to confiscations and low prices forced adoption of the relatively liberal NEP in the early 1920's. Farmers like those of Central Asia (above)
could take their produce to free markets. But the Kremlin regarded such
concessions only as a makeshift. With the first Five Year Plan, building of
collective farms (below) again became one of the Soviet's highest ambitions.

surpluses which simply did not exist. The time had come to think
of producing first and of requisitioning later.
This period of early War Communism is interesting because it
illustrates succinctly Communist thinking about agriculture. It
demonstrates that Bolshevik agricultural policy was, from the very
beginning, dictated by such considerations as the need to woo
the peasantry from the Social Revolutionary Party, by the desire
to split, and therefore to weaken, the peasants through the creation
of the Committees of Poor Peasants, and by a willingness to engage
in the most ruthless exploitation through forced requisitions based
on the significant but often erroneous assumption that the peasants
had surplus stocks. Only in the very last phase of this period,
and then only because of dire necessity, were the Bolsheviks driven
to realize that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent
that dogma, ideology, and political considerations would have to be
sacrificed if there was to be any food at all.
The period of War Communism is also significant because it
marked the birth and provided the testing ground of certain Communist techniques which were to become standard features of the
system not only in the Soviet Union itself but in the East European
satellites. These techniques included the creation of committees
of poor peasants, which served as instruments of denunciation and
exaction and shattered any political unity among the peasants
which could be directed against the Communist regime. They
included the imposition of arbitrary quotas, or arbitrarily defined
"surpluses," which bore little or no relation to the crops actually
harvested. And finally, they involved the use of a military or paramilitary worker's militia, to collect the harvest from a reluctant
and frequently hostile peasantry.
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The New Economic Policy

The virtual economic collapse which marked the end of the
period of War Communism was remedied only by measures which
led to the inauguration of a so-called "New Economic Policy."
In this period the attempt to impose state control over all economic
activity was abandoned and a relatively liberal economic practice
adopted in an effort to give all workers, whether rural or industrial, sufficient incentive to produce.
In agriculture this meant the end of forced requisitions and,
instead, the introduction of a tax in kind, calculated as a percentage of the crop harvested and adjusted in such a manner as to
offer rebates to those peasants who were prepared to expand the
cultivated areas of their farms. The New Economic Policy, of
course, like most liberalizations, was a gradual process. The introduction of a tax in kind was followed by a number of other
measures, such as permission to trade freely in agricultural produce,
and finally even the right to use hired labor on privately owned
farms. In effect, what this meant was that, for a number of years
at least, the Soviet government was prepared to ignore the organization of the agricultural economy and to rely on the operations
of the market to stimulate production. As a result the sown area,
which had fallen to about 77.7 million hectares in 1922, reached
110.3 million hectares in 1926, which is an increase of 42 per cent
in no more than four years. Almost the same growth was shown
by the grain area, which rose by 41 per cent during the same
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period. * The rate of recovery was in fact rapid enough so that
in 1927, or ten years after the Revolution, the sown area had returned almost to the pre-war level. A parallel recovery was registered in livestock population and production. By 1927 the total
number of farm animals was larger than it had been in 1916. This
aspect of recovery, however, was somewhat uneven. Thus, in
1927 there were some 31.6 million horses in the USSR as compared
to 35.8 million in 1916, or about 88 per cent of the pre-war total.
On the other hand, cattle herds were 12 per cent higher in 1927
than in 1916, hogs exceeded the 1916 totals by 10 per cent, and
sheep and goats by about 15 per cent. **
But the New Economic Policy had never been envisaged as a
lasting departure. Lenin and many of his associates considered a
policy which favored the peasant in his right to private property
and conceded the strength of the profit motive as little short of a
betrayal of the Communist ideal.
There were, however, a number of other and less purely ideological factors which contributed to the termination of the New
Economic Policy and with it of the era of peace in the countryside. These began to play an increasingly important part in the
late 1920's.
First there was the fact that though agricultural production
had almost recovered its pre-war levels, the marketing of agricultural products had failed to do so. In the crucial case of grain, for
example, sales in 1927 were no more than about 38 per cent of prewar. Even if allowance is made for the smaller land area of the
Soviet Union as compared to Czarist Russia, and due account taken
of other statistical variables, such a decline-given the intervening
growth in population-was an extremely alarming phenomenon.
Other agricultural products did not fare so badly, even though
none achieved a sales volume comparable to pre-war years. Thus,
... Sotsialisticheskoe Stl'oitel'stvo, Moscow, 1936.
...... V. P. Nifontov, Zhivotnovodstvo SSR v tsifl'akh, Moscow, 1932.
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1928 marketings of potatoes were 57 per cent of 1913, of sugar beets
90 per cent, of meat 95 per cent, and of milk and milk products
89 per cent.*
The reasons for this decline varied. The Communist party chose
to find its own reason in the relative inefficiency of the small farm,
and used this as one of the justifications for its later collectivization drive.
There is ample evidence, however, that the low prices paid
to the farmers during the years even of the New Economic Policy
played an even more important part. ** Rising industrial prices
and relatively stable agricultural prices reduced peasant incomes,
increased on-the-farm consumption, and diverted much of the sown
area to crops which could command the highest prices. The result
was once again a shortage of grain in the cities, which moreover
were growing rapidly in population as a result of the industrialization program.
The fact, however, that agricultural commodities were so significantly underpriced was itself the result of another complex
of factors. Thus, the Soviet government, for both ideological and
intensely practical reasons, was vitally interested in keeping the
price of foodstuffs low for the urban proletariat, and since the
general drive to raise capital from internal resources precluded a
program of agricultural subsidies, the only alternative was to see
to it that wholesale prices of produce remained artificially depressed. Likewise the Communist Party, while it recognized the
• All data from Sotsialisticheskoe St1'oitelsrvo J Moscow, 1936.
•• In its position as the largest single purchaser on the market the Soviet
state played a major role in fixing the price of grain. Although the peasants
were permitted to sell their grain on the free domestic market, the government, through its control of milling, storage, and transport facilities, could
still make its own bidding price the one at which, in effect, the peasants had
to sell. Thus grain prices remained too low throughout the second half of the
1920's, relative not only to industrial products but also to those of other
agricultural products. The result was that most peasants did not consider
grain as a useful "cash crop."
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TABLE I
THE RECOVERY OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE UNDER THE
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
MILl/ON HECTARES

125~--~~------------------------------

125

M I Ll/ON TONS

1913

100

50

25

SOWN AREA

GRAIN PRODUCTION

GRAIN AREA

It will be seen that, five years after the introduction of the New Economic Policy in
1921. substantial gains had been made when compared with the catastrophic declines
which had resulted from war, revolution, and civil strife. Still, on the eve of the first
Five Year Plan (1928) the relatively liberal policy of the N.E.P. had not been in
effect sufficiently long to bring grain production back to the levels which had been
achieved in 1913.
I

Source :

Sofsia/isficheskoe StroifeJ'sfvo, Moscow

I

1936
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need for higher food production, was nevertheless not inclined, for
either political or ideological reasons, to encourage the growth
of a strong peasantry. The New Economic Policy on the other
hand, by giving latitude to free enterprise in agriculture and retail
trade, had given rise to the formation of groups of relatively
prosperous farmers who were viewed by the Party as potentially
unreliable and even hostile to the regime. *

It was feared by certain elements in the Communist leadership
that the prolongation of this policy would eventually tend to create
a rural land-owning class, numerous, powerful, and hostile, which
might eventually out-balance the urban proletariat and thus jeopardize the aims of the entire Communist program.
But perhaps the most important reason for the abrogation of
the New Economic Policy was that the Soviet Union was about
to embark on the industrial revolution which attended the introduction of the Five Year Plans. The debate regarding the scope and
speed with which that revolution should be carried out had raged
within Party ranks for a number of years, and it was this fateful
struggle between the uncompromising "left" proponents of immediate and drastic action and the "rightist" opposition which eventuall y resulted in the victory of Stalin and the decision, late in 1927,
to embark immediately on the first of a series of Five Year Plans.
Even those aspects of the New Economic Policy which applied
only to agriculture could not survive this basic change in orientation, simply because the institutions and practices which had been

* This group of prosperous farmers was generally identified by the
term "kulaks." The Party and government attempted to equate them in
some fashion with the pre-revolutionary landlords, but in fact this comparison was quite unwarranted. Even though there were still class differences
in the villages, the land distribution of 1917 had brought about a leveling
of holdings throughout the countryside. The "kulaks" of 1928 had had a
scant ten years in which-either through luck or enterprise-to accumulate
a modest amount of wealth. The attempt to compare them with wealthy
pre-revolutionary landlords who had inherited land and fortune through
generations was therefore both inaccurate and extreme.
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condoned or even encouraged in the agricultural sector under
the NEP were not adapted to the task which the Communists
now required of that sector, namely, that of financing industrial
expanSIon.
Once again, as in the period of War Communism, agricultural
development was to be dictated by considerations not primarily
agricultural. The capital necessary to finance industrialization had
to be found, and the only available sector of the economy capable
of bearing the brunt was agriculture. In the words of one Communist leader, "the peasantry had to be squeezed" if factories were
to be built in the quantity and at the pace which the new policy
demanded; or, as Lenin had stated in connection with the earlier
period of War Communism, "surpluses had to be extracted"
once agaIn.
Faced with declining prices and this nevI threat to their
security, the peasants once again reacted by cutting their sales and
the Communists again responded by resorting to seizures. By 1928
a number of extraordinary measures were once again in effect.
Procurement drives were launched by dispatching so-called "red
trains" of workers and Party members into the countryside to
seize farm surpluses. The Committees of Poor Peasants vvere revived to serve as instruments for spotting and denouncing the
owners of grain supplies. Private grain trade was prohibited, and
harsh penalties were instituted for "speculation" in grain. These
measures succeeded in increasing both the absolute amounts and
the "marketed share" of grain obtained from the countryside. *
But they brought about other and less desirable results, among
them a decline in sowing and a consequent drop in harvests. Although in 1929 and 1930 the amount of agricultural produce
delivered to the state did increase, it soon became obvious that
production would have to rise much more rapidly if it were to
provide the wherewithal to finance industrial expansion.

* The marketed share is that part of the harvest which is not retained
in the countryside. As it increases, the absolute amounts delivered will also
increase, provided that the harvest either remains constant or increases.
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Now that war and civil disorder were matters of the past and
the Communist regime had endured for a full decade, both government and Party felt themselves in a much stronger position
than in the early days of uncertainty and struggle. The time had
apparently come to implement theory in practice, by putting the
dictates of dogma to the test for the first time. As an essential
concomitant of industrialization, the organization of the agricultural system would need to undergo a total change as well. Private
farming would have to come to an end and be supplanted by
collectivized agriculture as the dominant form of rural organization and production.
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Collectivization

In theories formulated long before the October Revolution,
Communist writers had defined the ideal form of socialist agriculture in terms of huge, state-controlled rural factories employing
armies of farm workers on terms as nearly similar to factory employment as couid be achieved in the countryside.
The expropriation of the large estates and the New Economic
Policy had, on the other hand, led to the establishment of
numerous small, family-sized farms throughout the Soviet Union.
Thus, at the beginning of the era of Five Year Plans, the goal
which the Communists envisioned was further avvay than in the
earliest days of the Civil War. But now that the die had been cast in
favor of "building socialism in one country"-according to the
precepts of Josef Stalin-by seeking to create an industrial bastion,
the ti.me had also come to force agricultural institutions into the
socialist mold.
From a political point of view, the architects of the Soviet
economic development program were motivated by the belief that
small-scale private enterprise was wholly incompatible with the
concept of a socialist society. As economists and technicians, they
were committed to the belief that farming on a large scale was
more efficient and therefore more desirable.
Lenin had expressed the political fears of the Bolsheviks when
he wrote:

2S

The small enterprise creates capitalism and the bourgeoisie
permanently, daily, hourly, inescapable, and on a mass scale.*

Some years later Josef Stalin, on the eve of the great industrialization drive, stated the Communist dilemma perhaps with even
greater clarity:
"The Soviet power [he said] cannot long be based on two contrasting foundations-on a large-scale socialist industry which
eliminates the capitalist elements, and on a small-scale individual
peasant economy which creates capitalistic elements."**

As we have noted, these ideological considerations were reInforced by the conviction that large farm units combined with
modern mechanical aids would profoundly revolutionize agricultural production. Even though enormously different conditions
prevailed in the two countries, the United States was greatly admired for the size of its farms and the extent of their mechanization.
This intoxication with sheer size and motive power led to the creation of enormous 100,000 hectare state farms which proved so costly
and inefficient that they were eventually condemned as manifestations of "gigantomania" and dissolved. Simultaneously, however:the Communists devoted their energies to the speedy creation of
collective farms.
The drive, which began in 1928 and gathered momentum rapidly in 1929, had reached formidable proportions by 1930. From the
very beginning, legal proceedings were instituted against "kulaks"
who, in theory at least, were rich peasants but in practice proved
to be almost anyone who refused to join a cooperative, was disliked
by his neighbors, or was considered politically unreliable. The
Committees of Poor Peasants were revived, and with them came
a return to the use of widespread denunciations as a pretext for
confiscation and seizure. A complex system of discriminatory
measures was instituted to be enforced both by the army and
V. 1. Lenin, Works, Vol. XXV, p. 173.
* * J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow 1934, p. 362.
:II:
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police. In fact, the cumulative force of this drive was such that,
in three short years, more than 50 per cent of the Russian peasantry
had been driven into collective farms. This was class war in the
fullest sense of the term, directed as it was toward the total "liquidation of the kulak as a class," the confiscation of his property, and
the rescinding of his civil rights. The speed and violence with
which this drive was carried out could not help but seriously affect
output once again. As in the days of War Communism, chaos
reigned in the countryside, and even though the Soviet state was
infinitely more powerful in 1930 than it had been ten years earlier
it was again obliged to call a temporary halt to a program which
had gone too far too fast. Stalin was forced to write his famous
open letter to the Communist Party entitled "Dizziness from
Successes."* In it he "condemned" the excesses of local authorities
who had become intoxicated with the apparent success of the collectivization campaign and reminded the zealots that membership
in the collective farms must be on a "voluntary" basis.
The reaction was immediate. More than half of those who had
"voluntarily" joined the collective farms left them. In the RSFSR,
the largest constituent republic in the Soviet Union, the percentage
of collectivized households fell from 60 to 23 within two months of
the publication of the letter.
But at this point there could be no more turning back. Coercive
measures which now included large-scale deportations were soon
revived; by mid-1931 about half of all peasant households were
once again collectivized, and by 1932 effective peasant resistance
was broken.
But the collapse of peasant resistance was not solely due to the
application of force and violence. It was as much the result of
the great famine which ravaged the Soviet Union during 1932-33
as of Communist terror and class warfare. The famine which
made these years so notable was, of course, not brought on by
'*' Pravda, Moscow, March 2, 1930.
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TABLE II
SOVIET ANIMAL HUSBANDRY UNDER THE
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
MILLION
HEAD

LIVESTOCK

HORSES

L
CATTLE

L
I
SHEEP
&
GOATS

L

PIGS

L
25

50

75

100

125

The above table illustrates the extent to which the end of civil war and the partial
reinstatement of personal incentives under the New Economic Policy contributed to the
growth of livestock in the Soviet Union. The destruction which had resulted from
the first World War and the internal disorders which followed was more than
compensated for by 1926. Only the number of horses remained slightly below the
pre-war figure.
Source:
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V. P. Nifontov, Zhivofnovodsfvo SSSR v fsifrakh, Moscow, 1932

reduced crop production alone but also by the persistently excessive government requisitions which were a product of the regime's
policy of exacting fixed delivery quotas for export and shipment to
the urban centers, quite irrespective of the actual size of annual
crop production. Had the crops been adequate, there might have
been enough to meet the needs not only of the government but
of the peasantry as well; since they clearly were not, there was not
enough grain left in the producing areas for consumption by the
rural population.
Thus the poor harvests of the early 1930's were not the result
of adverse weather conditions, but more directly of the collectivization drive itself. Even the dislocations which might have been
brought on by an orderly change-over to collectivization would
have been significant enough; but as the collectivization drive assumed the proportions of genuine class warfare in the countryside,
the results were bound to become disastrous. Crops were not harvested; peasants, who were left with little if any incentive to
produce, destroyed what small surpluses they had rather than
hand them over to the state; and they slaughtered their livestock
in order to feed themselves rather than surrender their animals
to the "collectivized" farms. The consequence of this policy was
general famine on a massive scale.
The Soviet government has never published adequate or accurate data on this period, and in the early 1930's it also banned
foreign observers from famine areas, so that it has always been
difficult to estimate the actual number of people who perished
during 1932 and 1933. It is only possible to make some reasonably
accurate estimates. Thus, by counting from the 1926 census onward
to the mid-1930's (that is, applying growth rates for 1926 cumulatively) and again counting backward from the next census which
was held in 1939, a discrepancy of about five-and-one-half million
people will be noted. The only apparent explanation for this
loss in population can be a large and abrupt increase in the mortality rate during the mid-thirties.* This figure, it may be added, is
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much more conservative than many estimates by observers who
were in the Soviet Union at the time, or who subsequently visited
the famine-stricken areas. While a wholly accurate count is not
possible even today, there can be no doubt that about five million
people, at the least, lost their lives as a result of famine, mass
deportations, and imprisonments, all of which characterized the
great collectivization drive of the early 1930's.
But if it is true that hunger and widespread starvation did
much to break whatever resistance the peasantry could muster
against the Communists, the famine also inflicted a severe setback
to Soviet agriculture itself. Fields remained fallow, harvests were
left to rot, and livestock were slaughtered. In theory at least, three
years had been enough to achieve the collectivization of the bulk of
Soviet land holdings, but the output of these holdings had declined
catastrophically in the process.
The statistical data detailing these losses in output have remained as much of an official secret as those dealing with the loss
of human life. In the 20 years from approximately 1930 to 1950
either information was suppressed completely or the published
figures were demonstrably distorted.~X<*
The first technique was essentially simple: few and meaningless
figures were released, which bore little if any resemblance to
reality. The second technique, involving deliberate misrepresent a-

'*' A

reduction in birth rates which could bring about such a population
decline in so short a time is almost inconceivable.
'*'. Any reader interested in this topic has only to compare the quantity
of data published before and after 1930. He will note that the first Five
Year Plan was published in two editions consisting of three large volumes.
The second Five Year Plan was detailed in one small volume. The third
and the first post-World War II Five Year Plans were published in the form
of small pamphlets only. At the same time, some of the most informative
Soviet journals, including the excellent Economic Review} stopped publicat ion. Even the annual Control Figures ceased to print extensive or meaningful data on sowing yields, deliveries, agricultural prices, livestock figures,
and other basic data.
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tion, usually called for the selection of base years which, by their
very choice, were bound to show favorable but illusory results.'*'
The third and most famous of these techniques was based on the
concept of the "biological yield," which required a new method of
harvest reporting so designed as to give a gross overstatement of
crop production.**
Under the best of circumstances crop estimates and actual harvests are bound to differ, if only because of genuine errors and
unexpected events such as hailstorms, heavy rains, and other natural
phenomena. The concept of "biological yield" is, therefore, all the
more rash and inaccurate since it tends, quite obviously, to increase
rather than reduce the margin of probable error. As used in the
Soviet Union it introduced a systematic upward bias because it
allowed for a margin of error which was far too low. The dis.. A classic example can be found in the calculations which were used
to hide livestock losses. This was done by comparing livestock herds in the
collective farms at the beginning of the Five Year Plan with the collectivized livestock population of 1937, or some other such year. This statistical
deception was based on the omission of the obvious fact that by 1937 almost
100 per cent of all livestock was collectivized, while in 1928 the comparable percentage was well below five per cent. Inevitably, therefore, the
spurious results of any such calculation showed a spectacular increase under
the Five Year Plans .
.. :It

By using this method the statistician was not asked to report the

barn crop-as had been done in the Soviet Union before the 1930"s and as
it is still done everywhere else. In other words, the reported crop was not
the amount which actually found its way into the barns. Instead, an estimate
of the potential crop was made in the fields before the actual harvest.
Then, this estimate was "corrected" downward to allow for potential losses
and reported as the actual harvest. At first the users of this method made
some attempt at objectivity by allowing for a ten per cent loss between
the field and the barn, and by careful surveys in the field. Later on, even
this pretense was dropped, and the technique degenerated into pure farce
as shown by this definition from an official publication which appeared
as late as 1944: "The harvest on the root, which is determined by sight
appraisal about one week before the start of the harvest, is accepted as the
actual crop. This appraisal is made for each crop once a year." Dictionary
Handbook on Social Economic Statistics, Moscow, 1944, p. 88.
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organized and apathetic kolkhozes lost a much higher percentage
of crops between the field and the barn than Soviet statisticians
were permitted to account for. The extent of this loss could be
calculated with considerable precision if the Soviet government
had ever published its data in terms of both barn and biological
yields, or had done so for at least one year. This, however, was
precisely what the Soviets did not wish to do; at first they published
crop data without even calling attention to the fact that a change
in reporting methods had taken place. To further confuse the
situation, the "loss margins" which the statisticians used in successive years were changed so as to keep some relationship between
the crop years, and to continue to report favorable results. This
was done because the crop losses in the early 1930's were heavier
than in the later years of the decade. To have used the same loss
margin in 1937 as in 1933 would have understated the 1937 harvest
in relation to that of the earlier period, which, of course, would
have been poor propaganda and therefore entirely undesirable
from the official point of view. The alternative of putting the
harvests of the early 30's in proper relationship to those some years
later would have revealed the full extent of the catastrophe which
took place during 1932 and 1933. Hence, having once chosen
what was at best a questionable system, the Soviet regime had no
choice but to keep on "adjusting" that system by reducing already
low "loss" allowances in the late 30's and 40's.
The result of these manipulations has been that Soviet harvests
were consistently overstated by some 20 per cent for about a fifth
of a century.
Once one has understood and made allowance for the overstatement of Soviet crop statistics, the actual economic costs of the
collectivization drive can also be assessed with some accuracy. In
doing so, one discovers that it was not until 1935 that grain production regained its 1926 level (76.6 million tons) and not until 1937a record year for the USSR-that the grain harvest exceeded the
highest pre-collectivization harvest, reaching 96 million tons. It
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Intensified class war and widespread seizures of peasant property marked the launching of the first Five Year Plan. Here, in

1928, Kuzbek authorities, backed by soldiers (right), conduct expropriation proceedings against an allegedly rich "kulak."

More than 5 million people perished and more than 75 per cent of Russian land
was collectivized between 1928 and 1933. The machine-this one purchased
abroad-became the dominant symbol of the agricultural future in the USSR.

For ideological rather than practical reasons, the Communists have always
attempted to introduce factory methods into agricultural production. Here, a
Machine Tractor Station driver is checked in by a clerk on a collective farm.

should be noted, however, that this was indeed an exceptional year.
Both the 1938 and 1939 harvests were not only below that of 1937,
but below 1930 as well.
Yield figures are even more revealing. Thus, in 1925 the average
yield of grain per hectare was 8.3 quintals, which rose to about
85 quintals in 1930. In 1932 it had fallen to 6.6 quintals (a decline
of about one-fourth), and it was not until the exceptional 1937
yields (9.2 quintals per hectare) that the levels of the twenties were
surpassed. Yet here again this was the result of one exceptional
year: the 1938 and 1939 grain yields averaged slightly below the
average for the last four years of the Ne\v Economic Policy (19251928).
An even more graphic picture of the aftermath of collectivization can be obtained from an examination of livestock data.
Here one notes that in June 1928, the last year of widespread
independent farming, there were about 335 million horses in the
Soviet Union, while immediately following the big collectivization
drive of 1932-3 their number had declined to 16.6 million, or less
than half. By 1938, ten years after the end of the NEP, the herd
had risen to 175 million, or somewhat less than two thirds of the
1928 figure. Over the same time span the numbers of other livestock declined similarly. Cattle fell from 705 million to 38.4 million head, or by almost half, between 1928 and 1933, and had only
climbed to 63.2 million head by 1938. Cows alone declined from
30.7 million head in 1928 to 19.6 million in 1933 and only regained
the 25.2-million-head figure in 1938. Sheep and goat herds declined
by almost two thirds between 1928 and 1933-that is, from 146.7
million head to 50.2 million-and failed to reach the three-quarter
mark of the 1928 total even a decade later, when these herds had
risen to barely 1025 million head. The hog population alone
bettered its numbers between 1928 and 1938 by rising from 26
million head to 30.6 million. But even in this case the collectivization process managed to take a heavy toll, since the 1933 herd
was well below that of 1928.
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The great collectivization drive completely changed the face
of the Soviet Union in a remarkably short period of time. From
the Communist point of view, this drive was an almost complete
success: by 1936, over 90 per cent of all households were collectivized and more than 96 per cent of the arable land in the Soviet
Union was incorporated into collective or state farms. In other
words, within the short period of seven years the private farmer
had virtually ceased to exist and the dream of a socialist agriculture
had been carried into practice.
But the price of this offering to ideological orthodoxy was
heavy indeed. It included no less than five million human lives.
Agricultural production had fallen to levels far below those which
had prevailed before collectivization was introduced with such
ruthlessness and on such a large scale. Livestock herds were
obliterated, and the population-both urban and rural-if it did not
actually starve to death, was nevertheless compelled to suffer hunger
and privation for no apparent reason other than that a set of dogmas
was being put to a practical test.
It is scarcely surprising, in the light of this terrible experience,
that Josef Stalin, in an exceptional moment of candor, once confessed to Winston Churchill that the collectivization drive and the
ensuing agricultural catastrophe had presented the greatest danger
which the Soviet Union had faced during its existence as the first
and only independent socialist state. Although Stalin's statement
was indubitably correct, it is significant that he failed to add an
explanation of why this danger was faced in the peculiarly abrupt
and inhuman way in which the Bolsheviks chose to face it, and
that he did not explain precisely what rewards to the Soviet people
this decade of sacrifice was supposed to have brought.
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The Present System
Although Soviet agricultural institutions have experienced a
series of minor changes since the end of the great collectivization
drive of the thirties, the broad outlines of the system have not
essentiall y changed. What, then, are the characteristic features of
the Soviet countryside? What are its distinguishing marks? And
how do these differ from farm institutions in other lands?

The Collective Farm
The collective farm, or kolkhoz, is the most typical and widespread of Communist agricultural institutions-a large farm created by a merger of individual plots of land, cultivated jointly by
its members. The land belongs neither to the farmers nor to the
farm itself, but remains the property of the state, which leases it
to the kolkhoz. All major tools, utensils, farm buildings, and livestock are owned not by individuals but by the collective farm, and
returns from proceeds are shared by the peasants according to their
labor input. The individual peasant members of the kolkhoz retain
title only to their houses, their individual tools, and a small piece
of land (usually known as a household plot), some poultry, and
an occasional piece of livestock. *
In theory, the kolkhoz is a voluntary organization operating on
democratic principles, administered by a chairman who is elected
* In the early stages of the Soviet revolution the ideal form of the collective farm was a "commune." Inspired by Fourier's "phalansteries" and
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by the membership from its own ranks. In practice, the system is
much more authoritarian. The history of the collectivization drive
and of the peasants' resistance provides ample and frequently tragic
proof that the kolkhozes are not, in fact, voluntary associations.
Similarly, although the formalities of the election process are observed, the chairman is in fact appointed, and is frequently not a
member of the kolkhoz at all but imported from some other area.
With increasing frequency he has tended not to be a peasant.*
Similarly, though the kolkhoz in theory enjoys wide authority
over its own cultivation program, its plans are in fact dictated by
the government in the form of quotas of specified crops which the
kolkhoz is legally obligated to produce and surrender to the government. As a result, the economic life of the kolkhoz, and of its
members, is not shaped independently at all, but is in reality only
an expression of the government's policy and specific requirements.
The kolkhoz is the most common and widespread agricultural
institution in the Soviet Union, but it has never found great favor
with either the government or the Communist Party, both of
which have always considered it no more than a step on the road
to a truly socialist agricultural enterprise.

The State Farm
Although the state farm, or sovkhoz, has never achieved real
success in the Soviet Union, it is an institution which deserves
Owen's COmmUnItIeS, these were characterized by joint ownership of aU
assets, both large and small, and by communal living. These, however,
proved so highly unpopular, as well as impractical, that they were abandoned, together with a much looser form of collective farming known as
the TOZ, which maintained individual ownership and only stressed communal labor. The institution which is described here, also known as the
Hartel," has been the only one in existence since the thirties.
'*' To illustrate this point, it need only be recalled that in 1954, in connection with the virgin lands drive and the corn planting program, fully
a third of all collective farm chairmen were summarily replaced by Party
officials from urban areas.
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considerable attention, if only because it is-in theory at leastthe model of ,,,hat the Soviets think Communist agriculture should
be. Institutionally, it can be characterized essentially as a nationalized agricultural factory. The land, utensils, farm buildings, livestock, residential housing-in fact all real or movable propertybelongs to the state.* The peasants working on the state farms are
paid wages according to the nature of their duties. If the crop or
livestock plans are not fulfilled, the farm workers may be penalized;
alternatively, if plans are exceeded the employees receive special
rewards. The system of remuneration is, in other words, almost
identical to that in socialized industry.
The popularity of the sovkhoz among the Soviet leaders is
easy to explain. The Communists, who profoundly distrust the
peasant and who believe the institution of private property to be
inimical to their system, see in the sovkhoz the most convenient
vehicle for the creation of a rural proletariat. Similarly in early
years they were deeply fascinated by what they thought to be
the superior economic efficiency of the large producing unit. The
state farm, frequently consisting of the lands of former large
estates, seemed to provide the ideal solution: a mechanized, rural
factory, amenable to efficient political control.
But, in practice, the sovkhoz proved to be far from ideal. From
the beginning, the very size of these sovkhozes involved an extraordinary waste of time and fuel merely to bring men and machinery to the work sites. Soon afterward it became apparent that
other costs were also very high, even in comparison with the inefficient kolkhozes. Even though an attempt was made to operate
them like factories, the incentive process could never be made
to work efficiently on the sovkhozes. For one thing the very
nature of agriculture renders the formulation and execution

* It should be noted that all land belongs to the state under Soviet law:
this is true not only of the land of a collective farm but also of the household plot. The farmer is entitled to the use of the land, but he may not sell
or alienate it in any way.
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of preCIse plans difficult, since the controlled conditions which
prevail in a factory are impossible. Secondly, the managers of
these farms were never much interested in achieving spectacular
successes. They knew that an over-fulfilled plan would bring a
premium; but this year's extraordinary achievement might easily
become next year's norm. Thus, a combination of rigid and often
unrealistic planning, managerial apathy, and shortages of equipment, resulted in frequently exorbitant unit costs, for which the
government had to pay in the form of subsidies. For these the
sovkhoz, unlike the kolkhoz, was eligible since it was a state
institution.
Given these basic limitations, many of the state farms led
a brief and precarious existence. The enormous sovkhozes of the
nineteen thirties were soon condemned, and divided into smaller
and relatively more efficient kolkhozes. Nevertheless, the essential
ideas which lie at the root of the sov khozes as units of agricultural
organization and production have shown remarkable persistence
-as evidenced by the attempt, in Stalin's last years, to construct a
number of gigantic "agrocities." The plan called for the consolidation of widely scattered kolkhoz and sovkhoz lands, for the abolition
of existing living areas and their amalgamation into new and larger
"rural towns," for the centralization of communal services, and,
implicitly, for the intensification of controls.
This program once again proved to be short-lived. The inevitable dislocations which it would have entailed threatened a degree
of chaos in production which the Soviet Union could not afford,
and the chronic shortages of building material from which the
Soviet Union has always suffered made any plan which called
for the construction of residential dwellings and communal buildings for several million people totally impracticable.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that even this failure has finall y
led to the abandonment of the ideas which apparently inspired it.
On the contrary: the struggle between ideology and experience sti] 1
seems very much alive, as shown by the fact that the recently
40

In 1953, when these collective farmers were photographed 30 miles from Moscow, Khrushchev informed the Party of serious
failures in the agricultural system: continuing machinery shortages, poor crop yields, and depressed standards of living.

In order to raise Soviet production of grain, settlers like these of the 1930's are being urged to grow wheat on the remote
"virgin lands" of Siberia. The government has offered them good pay and other benefits but success remains in doubt.

inaugurated drive to settle the "virgin lands" in the interior of the
Soviet Union has once again been assigned by the state and the
Party to a number of newly created state farms.

The Machine Tractor Stations
A third and equally basic feature of the Russian countryside
is the machine tractor station (MTS). This institution plays a
double role in Soviet agricultural economics. Its ostensible purpose
is to serve as a central pool of machinery for use by the collective
farms of a given district, but this is by no means its only function.
It is in addition, a major crop-collecting agency, and as such
operates as one of the chief and most powerful instruments of
state control in the countryside.
The first of the MTS were organized in 1930 to furnish the
swiftly growing number of collective farms with machinery. This
particular course was chosen in part at least because the government lacked the farm machinery to equip the individual kolkhozes,
but it is doubtful that this was the chief reason even at the beginning of the collectivization drive. Ownership and control of machinery would have given the collectives too dangerous a measure
of independence from the government and Party. Hence, as the
supplies of machinery gradually increased they were turned over
to more and larger MTS, which in turn acquired the characteristics
of permanent institutions.
As the agency controlling the bulk of all farm machinery, the
MTS came to perform most of the mechanical work connected with
farm production, including such essential processes as plowing,
harrowing, harvesting, threshing, and other related activities. For
these services, each of the stations is paid not cash, but a portion
of the crop which it helps to harvest, the exact fee being determined
by an elaborate schedule. While the MTS are state institutions,
their personnel are not entirely on the state's payroll. Tractor
drivers and other machine operators, for example, are paid directly
by the collective farm, while only the managerial staff, always
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including a political officer, are directly employed by the
government.
Although the contract between a collective farm and its MTS is
theoretically based on the equality of both parties, the latter is
actually in a much stronger bargaining position. From a political
viewpoint, the MTS is one of the chief emissaries of the central
government in the countryside; and in the Soviet Union the central
government is always likely to inspire a measure of deference and
fear. Again, because it is the sole custodian of all-important machinery, it is apparent to both parties that no collective farm can
gather its harvest, meet its obligatory delivery quotas, or feed its
members without the equipment which the MTS disposes. As a
result, and quite apart from the tenets of Soviet theory, the
kolkhoz finds itself in an inferior position, . and this the MTS
usually exploits, either with or without official sanction. Since the
MTS almost always service more than one kolkhoz and since the
MTS are, in any case, usually behind schedule (by reason of mechanical breakdowns, shortages of spare parts, or faulty work
organization) they are clearly in a position to decide which kolkhoz
shall be serviced first. Or again, by seeking the necessary adjustment of payment schedules, the MTS in practice are able to dictate
what a collective farm can and cannot sow, by claiming to be
able to harvest only those crops which are most profitable to themselves and coincidentally most useful to the state.*
Thus it is fair to say that the network of MTS is not only the
third but also the pivotal instrument characterizing Soviet agricultural institutions, at least insofar as the MTS system is able to exert
a decisive influence on the operations and on the ultimate successes
which the other two can achieve.

* Under the complex accounting devices which characterize all Soviet
economic activity, certain types of work are judged to be more profitable
than others, even though they may not be more arduous or more useful
socially.
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State Procurements and Peasant Incomes
The system just described is designed to extract a maximum of
produce from the countryside. Its primary purpose is not to further
output or to increase peasant incomes, but rather to guarantee a
regular flow of grain and other agricultural commodities to state
warehouses. This, it should be noted, it done not only through the
instrumentality of the MTS, whose share of each year's crops
constitutes the state's largest single source of agricultural products;* in addition, the state regularly imposes a set of delivery
quotas which each of the collective farms is legally obligated to
meet in full, regardless of weather conditions, crop yield, or the
quality and quantity of the harvest.
The specific amounts to be delivered to the state depend on the
type of crop, the size and location of the farm, and, of course,
on the current needs of the state. They are, in other words, fixed
amounts determined in advance, and never a percentage of the
harvested crop. It necessarily follows that when the needs of the
state are high and the harvest poor, these fixed and inescapable
obligations impose a severe hardship on the peasants, both individually and collectively.**
In theory, at least, this might have left the peasant with no
income whatever, except for his share of the receipts which the
state pays to each collective farm for the collection of its crop. In

:II: As an example, the figures for 1939-40 show that 19 per cent of the
grain crop was handed over as payment to the MTS, while only 14 per cent
was delivered directly to the state in the form of compulsory deliveries.
This total of 33 per cent of the crop must then be compared with the
share which the state in turn distributed to the peasants, which accounted
for only 23 per cent of the crop, Izvestia, Moscow, March 29, 1941.
:11::11: The rigidity of the system is such that if, for any reason, a kolkhoz
cannot meet its assigned quotas from the current harvest or its own reserves,
it is forced to purchase the amount of its deficit on the free market and at
considerable cost.
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better years this base income is, of course, supplemented by a
division of the residual produce of each kolkhoz to its membership,
carried out according to a complex and variable accounting system.
Under this system, the kolkhoz member is paid either in cash
or in kind, depending on the amount of labor he had performed
on behalf of the collective farm. The accounting unit used to determine that amount is the "labor day," the value of which varies
with the nature of the work involved and the length of time spent
in the performance of a given task. * The number of labor days
accumulated by a peasant determines his share of the collective
farm's income, after legal obligations to the state are met.
In the early days of collectivization these two were virtually the
only sources of the peasant's income. In practice, however, it soon
became clear that so rigid a system was unworkable, since it
provided little or no incentive to cultivate the soil. Over time, therefore, several concessions were made to the kolkhoz memberships.
First, the individual peasant was allowed a small private plot of his
own and granted permission to keep a rigidly limited number of
Ii vestock on it. ** Secondly, the kolkhozes were conceded the pri vilege of operating so-called collective farm markets, to which the
kolkhoz as a whole and its individual members were permitted
to bring the produce which remained after all obligations to the
state had been met. Prices in this market were determined by the
relationship of supply and demand, and were as a rule considerably
higher than those paid by the state for compulsory deliveries.
These added incentives, however, quite naturally tended to
produce results of which the state and Party could not possibly
approve. The collective farmers began to spend increasing amounts
of time on their private plots instead of the collective farm land.
:II: For example, one day's work performed by a combine operator or senior
tractor driver is worth two "labor days," while that same day's work spent
as a cleaning woman is worth only one half a "labor day."
:11::11: The size of these plots and the number and kinds of animals varied
from region to region, and also changed with the passage of time.

46

They learned almost immediately that time and effort spent on
the household plot were infinitely more remunerative than any
they could devote to the cultivation of collective land. The government's response to this intensely human development was to introduce a mandatory minimum number of labor days for each
member of a collective farm. Any member who did not spend
this prescribed number of labor days on the lands of the kolkhoz
became subject to expulsion. Even though membership in a collective farm has always been far from popular in the Soviet Union,
such an expulsion nonetheless constitutes a serious threat to any
farmer. Inevitably, the expulsion of anyone member of a collectivized household results in a loss of family earnings. In more
extreme cases, involving heads of households and their families, it
means that the individuals concerned have simply forfeited all
possibilities of earning their living in the countryside, for the obvious reasons that they have lost their share of the land and the
cattle, and that private and independent farming has disappeared
from the Soviet countryside.
Another and even less desirable effect of concessions to the profit
motive was an attempt by the peasantry to expand-usually in an
illicit way-the size of their private plots. This occurred on a
particularly ominous scale during World War II when, as a result
of confusion and an inevitable relaxation of supervision, millions
of acres of collectivized land simply "disappeared," and found their
way into household plots.
At the war's end the Soviet government was, of course, able
to re-establish its system of controls and to recover the "lost" lands;
but it was hardly able to obliterate the peasant's desire to rid himself of the restraints imposed by the collectivization system. Soviet
farmers have not, as some East European peasants still do, the
alternative of escaping from a system of collectivized agriculture.
Even so, they still show their resentment by employing every possible means to evade the exactions of the state and to assert their
right to private initiative.
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In the period following Stalin's death, the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union has felt obliged to show greater consideration
to the peasantry than in many years. Once again it has introduced
a number of concessions, even though these are only adjustments
rather than fundamental changes of the system. The innovations
have included price increases on the crops which are delivered to
the government, either in the form of compulsory deliveries or
voluntary sales;* a reduction in the quotas themselves; and the
lowering, or elimination, of the special taxes paid on private plots.
Nevertheless, after a span of 40 years the basic features of the
system remain substantially unchanged. The collective farm and
the MTS are still the twin pillars of Soviet agriculture; the bulk of
the harvest still goes to the state rather than to the peasant. Rigid
ideological and governmental controls over the peasantry have been
retained, so that the farmer still has no power to determine what
he will produce, how he will produce it, and to whom he may sell.**
This, in broad outline, is the agricultural system which, after
decades of development in the USSR, has been exported to, and
imposed on, those nations of Eastern Europe and Asia in which
Communism has gained political control during the past 10 years.
It now remains to assess the results which that system has achieved.

'*' After fulfilling its compulsory delivery quotas the kolkhoz can sell its
remaining produce to the state instead of on the collective farm market.
The prices which are paid are well above those paid for compulsory deliveries, even though they are still below free market price levels. There
are certain incentives for selling directly to the state, including more favorable credit terms, special discounts on industrial products, and several others.
'*' '*' An illustration of the inherently authoritarian and involuntary character of Soviet agricultural institutions is provided in the corn growing
campaign which was launched at the behest of Party Secretary Nikita
Khrushchev in 1954. Once the decision to expand corn production had
been made in the inner circles of the government and Party, it appears
that some 60 million hectares of corn were immediately planted on Soviet
collective farms, in an unparalleled burst of "spontaneity" which required
no orders from the higher authorities.
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TABLE .i ll
THE COST OF SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION
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Within four years of the inauguration of Stalin's First Five Year Plan, Soviet agriculture
suffered a series of dramatic setbacks. The recovery and gains which had been achieved
under N.E.P. were wiped out. The production of grain and livestock dropped to
the levels which had prevailed during the worst days of the civil war. Ten years after the
introduction of the First Five Year Plan, the damage had not been repaired.
Note:

Both the 1932 and 1938 grain crop figures are estimates. Grain
yields for the former year have never been established with exactitude because of the Soviet Government's continued reluctance
to issue reliable statistics. The figure for 1938 has been adjusted
to compensate for the upward bias which is imparted by the use
of "biological yield" measures in official Soviet tabulations.

Sources:

Sofsialisticheskoe Stroifel'stvo, Moscow, 1936 and Sotsialisticheskoe
Selskoe Khoziaistvo, Moscow. 1939
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The Results
To determine whether a policy has been a success depends,
to a large degree, on our criteria. Clearly, a policy may be briliantly successful according to one set of values and a dismal failure
according to another. In the case of an agricultural policy the
usual tests are relatively obvious, and normally include the measurement first of production, then of the income of the producer. The
first criterion is probably the more self-evident, since there is no
sphere of economic activity in which the product is more directly
useful to humanity. The second criterion is also rather simple,
because, if most economic activity is motivated by a desire for
gain, then in all but totally self-sufficient communities, production
is undertaken with a view to increasing the individual's real income
through trade. As a rule, moreover, these two criteria are complementary: if production is higher, so is the income of the
producer.*
These criteria, because of their universal applicability, can also
be used in making an assessment of the results achieved by the
agricultural policies of the Soviet Union. Yet lest it be claimed by
apologists of the Soviet system that Communist policy objectives

* Exceptions to this general rule do, of course, exist. Increased production may, by lowering prices, reduce income, a result which in fact was the
case in most European countries during the 30's. Nor was the Soviet Union
entirely immune from this characteristic of depression: the fall in world
prices forced it to increase its exports to maintain income from foreign
trade.
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Khrushchev has promised that the Soviet Union will surpass American production of meat, milk, and butter by 1960. To help
achieve this goal, a delegation of Soviet experts vj~ited the U .S. in 1955, shown here studying American farming techniques.

in agriculture have always been primarily social and political rather
than purely economic in character, an attempt will also be made
to see just how well the Soviets have fared in pursuit of these
essentially non-economic objectives.

Agricultural Production
What, then, is the production record achieved in the USSR
over four decades? And, perhaps even more significantly, what is
the record in the East European People's Democracies after almost
ten full years of concerted effort to pattern their own institutions
on the Soviet model, applying the lessons of Soviet experience?
Such a combined survey may certainly be expected to have considerable bearing on the question of the efficiency of Soviet agricultural methods.
In 1956, largely as a result of sudden expansion of grain lands
in Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union produced some 130 million metric
tons of grain, while before the revolution the average annual crop
for the years 1909-1913 was in the vicinity of 82 million tons. On
the face of it this appears to be an almost spectacular increase.
The reason, of course, lies in the fact that 1956 was, in many
respects, an exceptional year. The average for the last five years, on
the other hand, when compared with the pre-revolutionary figures,
presents a more realistic and also much less impressive picture.*
Thus, average grain production over the period 1950-1956 was about
101 million metric tons annually, which represents a 30 per cent
average increase over the pre-revolutionary period. Even this, however, may be regarded as a fairly impressive gain until account is
taken of the population increase which took place in the Soviet
Union in the meantime. Czarist Russia, immediately preceding

'*' Since agricultural production is always subject to a number of unpredictable elements, averages over a period of years give a more reliable measure
than the data for any given year can do.

A
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Despite many promises of a better life which the Soviet rulers
have made to the Russian peasant, his life has not improved
appreciably over the past four decades. Farmers, like this one
photographed in 1954, have paid the price, but have failed
to reap the benefits of rapid industrialization in the USSR.
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World War I, had a population of some 138 mll110n, while the
Soviet Union today-within a land area roughly comparable-has
a population slightly in excess of the 200 million mark. This 45 per
cent increase in population will be seen to be not only well in
excess of the grain output, but in fact half again as high. Moreover,
even if it is assumed that the USSR will henceforth be able to maintain an average annual grain production of about 130 million tons,
which there are grounds to doubt, this 58 per cent increase in output would still not be much in excess of the population increase.
Hence, when seen in this context, it may fairly be said that Soviet
grain production has failed to register impressive gains, and that
it is in fact doubtful whether the Russian consumer of 1957 is
eating more or better bread than he might have in 1913.
The growth of the livestock population has also been less than
remarkable. In 1916, the last pre-revolutionary census year, Czarist
Russia possessed approximately 60.3 million head of cattle, of which
some 26 million were cows. The increase for cattle in general is on
the order of 17 per cent, and that of cows somewhat higher. Once
again both are well below the Soviet population increase. Admittedly, the quality and yields of the livestock have improved.
Whereas the average annual yield of milk per cow was about
1000 kilograms in pre-revolutionary days, it had risen to about 1550
kilograms per cow on collective farms by 1956. Yet even this improvement reflects the generally poor level of Soviet livestock herds.
The 1550 kilogram yield on collective farms is only about two
thirds that of the 2400 kilogram yields achieved on the state farms
in 1956 which, although they are the highest in the Soviet Union,
still remain well below the milk yields of other countries. *
It is, of course, beyond doubt that the Soviet Union has made
considerable progress over the Czarist Russia of 40 years ago.
Yet one cannot lose sight of the fact that the agriculture of pre-

'*' As cows on state farms accounted for about six per cent of the total
in 1956, the national average milk production in the USSR was roughly
1650 liters. These figures, to become meaningful, must be compared with the
yields achieved in other representative countries such as the United States,
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revolutionary Russia was retarded and relatively unproductive
w hen compared with the agricultural systems of Western Europe.
In fact it is fair to say that only the large landed estates used to
produce with any degree of efficiency, while the mass of the
peasantry was engaged in sub-standard cultivation, employing both
tools and manpower with far less skill and efficiency than elsewhere
in Europe. The February and October revolutions of 1917, the spontaneous division of the land, and a series of peasant uprisings provide ample evidence of the low standards of pre-revolutionary agriculture. Given this historical background, it can hardly be unjust
to say that agriculture in general, and particularly the attainment
of increased production levels, should have been the very first
concern of the Soviet government. The fact that even over a period
of four decades it has failed to achieve an increase in the production rate commensurate with population growth cannot be explained merely by reference to political or ideological considerations. Whatever these considerations may have been, and whether
they are or are not laudable, the actual results testify to the system's
lack of flexibility and its apparent inability to provide an adequate
food base for precisely that socialist society which the Soviet leaders
have been ready to exalt.
The Soviet regime seems to be well aware of the failure of
agriculture to match either its own industrial development or
the agricultural development of other industrialized nations. The
"virgin lands" program which was launched with much fanfare
in 1954 is perhaps the best proof of this awareness. During that year
some 18.5 million hectares of previously fallow land were sown to
grain, and by late 1956 the extent of the newly planted area had
risen to over 35 million hectares. Most of this land is in Siberia
and Kazakhstan, both of which are poor in moisture, and although
the project has yielded a good first harvest it represents a dramatic
2500 kilograms; United Kingdom, 2900 kilograms; West Germany, 2900
kilograms; and France, 2050 kilograms. In countries which specialize in
livestock production yields are higher still-for instance, in Switzerland,
3150 kilograms, and Denmark, 3560 kilograms.
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and uncertain gamble. The areas in question are far from normal
transportation channels, have few roads, no established communities, and as of this date virtu all y no farm buildings. An initial investment of considerable magnitude was required merely to open
the area to cultivation. Now, enormous expenditures are necessary
to settle the new sovkhozes, to equip them with still scarce farm
machinery, to build the necessary grain storage facilities, and finally
to transport grain to the consuming areas. Under any circumstances,
a government would hesitate to embark on such a venture unless
it desperately needed grain, and unless it were willing to take considerable risks to get it.
Whether, in fact, the risks which have been taken will justify
themselves it is too early to say. Only the dangers stand out in
clear relief. The combination of low rainfall and shallow topsoil
raises the serious hazard of an enormous dustbowl, which could
not only destroy the soil of the virgin lands, but also damage
neighboring areas. Even exceptional rainfall in these areas would
not eliminate this danger, but merely postpone it! Nor are the
apparent successes of the past two years a guarantee of long-range
success. Moisture retention in the waste area appears to be extremely low. This becomes a highly significant fact when it is
recalled that parts of the so-called virgin lands had actually been
put under cultivation in the early thirties only to be left fallow
in later years. The yields obtained on these lands have been
substantially lower than those achieved on genuinely virgin soils.
This would seem to indicate that even over a time span of 20
years the soils of Kazakhstan and Siberia have not succeeded in
accumulating or retaining enough moisture to produce an economically justifiable yield. This experience may very well repeat
itself in the future. Grain yields may fall off sharply after two or
three more harvests because of the declining moisture content of the
soil. If this should happen, the entire region will have to be rested
for an indeterminate time, whereafter it mayor may not continue
to produce at lower yields than at the present.
Unlike these future risks, however, the heavy investments and
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dislocations in other agricultural areas brought about by the diversion of machinery, personnel, and fertilizers are real and present
costs, which will continue to affect the economy even if the productivity of the virgin lands should fall drastic all y.
The dangers inherent in the "virgin lands" program are, if
anything, accentuated by concurrent efforts to introduce corn crops
on a massive scale in the other and older agricultural regions of the
USSR. This effort involves the transfer of land currently under
wheat to corn in view of the latter's greater versatility as against
Russia's traditional bread grain crops. It also involves a sharp cutback in wheat production in most parts of European Russia, the
introduction of new plowing and cultivation methods, the construction of silage facilities, and the manufacture of large numbers of
corn cultivators.
In theory at least, both this and the "virgin lands" grain can
fill the gap created by the reduction of the older wheat areas.
If climatic conditions over the next several years are virtually
ideal, this latest Soviet gamble with its agricultural resources may
have a chance of real success. Wheat production on marginal land
will have been substantially expanded, while the anticipated increase in corn production will increase available food supplies not
only for human but also for livestock consumption. If, however,
grain production falls below expectations, if poor weather conditions should prevail, or if future corn yields do not meet planned
target levels, then the whole of the most recent effort to revolutionize Soviet agriculture will be in grave jeopardy.
From a purely humanitarian point of view, it is certainly to be
hoped that these programs will meet at least with some measure
of success, thereby giving the Soviet peasant and consumer in
general some small feeling of confidence that he has outdistanced
the perennial dangers of hunger and famine. Yet the fact that
even this meager gain is still in doubt can only be read as a disastrous reflection on both the management and the achievements
of Soviet agriculture. Where, after 40 years, are the fruits of
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industrialization and the development of "socialist technology"?
Why, after almost half a century, are such emergency programs
and heavy risks still necessary? Wherein lies the alleged superiority
of a society which has thus far failed to achieve a steady and
reliable increase in food production, commensurate with population
growth?
In the light of the Soviet record, it is not surprising that the
achievement of socialized agriculture in the East European satellites
has been far from satisfactory. A brief survey of production in these
countries will illustrate the point.
Thus, in Poland, which was a predominantly agrarian country
before the Communist seizure, agricultural production, far from
having registered significant progress over the past decade, has
registered a net decline. According to official Polish sources, the
grain crop during the five years 1950-1955, including wheat, barley,
and oats, was only some 85 per cent of the 1934-38 average.* Only
rye, with a production of 99.8 per cent of pre-war, and sugar
beets with 109 per cent of pre-war, have either maintained or
surpassed the 1934-38 average. All others have registered declines
with barley production, for instance, at barely two thirds of the prewar average.
These losses have not been due to any reduction of the sown
area. Instead, they are the result of a sharp fall in yields. In fact,
during the first half of the present decade, grain yields were
only about 92 per cent of pre-war and potatoes about 85.5 per cent,
while sugar beets, whose output actually increased during this
period, only attained 71 per cent of pre-war. This decline both
in yields and production has not been and cannot be explained in
terms of climate and all the variables which this term implies.
Instead, the sources of this failure to maintain, much less develop,
Polish agriculture must be sought in the general crisis brought on
by essentially the same errors of judgment and policy which have

* All comparisons involving pre- and post-war Poland are basea on adjustments to compensate for border changes.
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characterized Soviet experience: forced collectivization, the systematic reduction of incentives, excessive and one-sided industrial
investment, and the varied but persistent forms of persecution
directed chiefly against the peasantry.
The situation created by these various factors is also reflected
in Polish livestock data. The cattle herd in 1955 was only 80 per
cent of pre-war, and only small livestock, such as sheep, which
increased by almost 120 per cent, have registered any gains. While
it is true that World War II destroyed many of Poland's cattle,
this by no means provides a full explanation for the failure of the
Polish livestock herd to increase over a 12-year period. Nor has the
decline been only quantitative; it has been qualitative as well,
as shown, for instance, by milk yields, which often serve as a
criterion for the quality of cattle. Here again one finds that
1955 yields were about 87 per cent of pre-war-a fall from 3,166
kilograms to 2,743 kilograms per cow.*
But if the Polish case were an isolated one, it might be considered an exception. In fact, it is typical of the experience of the
other states of Eastern Europe. Thus Hungary was also a predominantly agricultural country before World War II, and a major
grain exporter. More recently it has been forced into the position
of a grain importer. In 1955, the year before the October revolt,
Hungarian wheat production was 97 per cent of pre-war, rye
production 76 per cent, and oat production 62 per cent. Gains were
registered only in barley, corn, and some technical crops. Livestock
herds declined as they did elsewhere in the area. The cattle herd
in 1956 was 94 per cent of pre-war, horses numbered some 82 per
cent, while only sheep and hogs registered gains.
In Czechoslovakia (which differs from the other Soviet satellites
in that it alone was not a predominantly agricultural country when
the Communists achieved power) the pattern tends nevertheless

* It

is significant to note how much higher these yields are than those
which have been achieved by the best herds in the USSR at the best
of times.
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to repeat itself. The production of cereals in 1956, the best year
since 1948, was still below the 1934-38 average. Potato production
in 1956 was only about 92 per cent of the pre-war average, while
the output of sugar beets had remained stationary.* Thus, although
agricultural production in general has not suffered a spectacular
decline, it has also failed to register any improvement-in spite of
the fact that the mechanization of agriculture was well advanced
before the 1948 coup d'etat, and that the Communists in Czechoslovakia inherited a well developed industrial plant whose subsequent expansion presented different and rather lesser problems than
those encountered in the attempt to industrialize predominantly
rural economies. This also despite the fact that war-time damages
to the Czechoslovak economy in general, and therefore its agriculture as well, was certainly less than that suffered by its neighbors.
Unfortunately, the Bulgarian and Romanian governments have
not published data comparable to those furnished by other Communist countries. It may be assumed, however, that had their
achievements been more impressive than their neighbors' they
would not have hesitated to make them known.
This review of developments in the Soviet Union and the
East European satellites (which might easily be extended to
Yugoslavia, which occupies an almost unique position in the community of Communist states) cannot fail to lead an impartial
observer to the conclusion that "socialist" agriculture as developed
in these states has not succeeded in increasing production, and has
therefore not contributed to raising the consumption levels of the
populations concerned. Certainly in the Soviet Union, it is doubtful that the average of all agricultural production has kept pace
with the average rate of population increase. After forty years
of trial and error, advance and retreat, the Soviet government must
:II: Czechoslovak livestock production has shown a similar pattern of development. In 1956 the cattle herd had reached 96 per cent of pre-war, while
cows numbered some 85 per cent of the pre-war herd, and only pigs and
sheep now exceed pre-war totals.
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TABLE lY
GRAIN PRODUCTION AND POPULATION GROWTH
IN THE U.S.S.R.: 1917 - 1957
MILLION INHABITANTS AND MILLION TONS
_
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The population of the Soviet Union has registered a steady and relatively rapid
increase since the Revolution of 1917. The rate of growth was not a ppreciably slowed
by the civil war {1918-1920}, the great famine (1932-33) or the second World War.
Grain production, on the other hand, has been uneven. It has increased only about
35 per cent as against a 44 per cent population increase during a 4O-year period.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that grain production in 1917 was greater than in
1947 and that production in 1957 had only registered a 12.4 per cent increase over
the admittedly excellent harvest of 1937.
Note:

Wherever possible, population and output data refer to the same
year. In some cases, however, it was necessary to use different years.
Thus, 1917 data refers to the '913 census year; the 1927 population
figure is adjusted from the 1926 census year; the 1937 figure is
derived from the 1939 census. The figures for 1957 are estimates.

SQurces:

Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo, Moscow, 1936, Sotsialisticheskoe Se/doe Khoziaistvo, Moscow, 1939, and Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR,
Moscow, 1956
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still resort to emergency measures, while the economy as a whole
remains in a state of serious imbalance. The very effort which is now
under way to reshape agricultural production patterns, and thus to
create economic institutions which will provide an adequate food
base for the Soviet population, is itself the most eloquent admission
possible that four decades of Communist agricultural policy have
resul ted in failure.
This fact is illustrated once again, and if possible with even
greater clarity, by an examination of the East European scene.
There, agricultural production has not only failed to keep pace
with industrial expansion and demand; it has fallen far behind
both with the result that East European agricultural production
today is lower than it was before the Communist seizure of power.
Even though it may be argued that some parts of East and Central
Europe did sustain heavy losses during World War II, and that they
have had little more than a decade to effect recovery, it is still very
doubtful whether this has any bearing on the present situation.
Recovery patterns in other parts of Europe, and indeed the world,
indicate that it does not, and that the real explanation must be
sought in the character of Communist agricultural institutions,
which have consistently failed to produce adequate, not to mention
impressive, results over much longer spans of time.

Peasant Income
The production record of Soviet and satellite agriculture would
leave few grounds on which to suppose that peasant incomes in
the Communist orbit have risen while output has fallen or remained stationary. Logically, one would be led to expect the opposite. Yet, it is far from easy to support logical inference with factual
data.
The Soviet Union, for instance, has not published standard of
living data, retail price indices, or family budgets for over 27
years; and the People's Democracies, with the possible exception
of Poland, have hardly published more. Nevertheless, though the
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available information is necessarily fragmentary it is possible to
form a meaningful picture of peasant income.
As noted above, the kolkhoz farmer generally derives his income from two sources: (1) his share of the net kolkhoz income calculated according to the number of "labor days" which he
has accumulated; and (2) receipts from the sales of produce raised
on his household plot. The recent publication of pertinent data
in a number of Soviet journals makes possible an approximate calculation of the amounts of cash and produce which the peasant
can expect from these two sources of income. * The data suggest
that annual receipts of about 257,000,000 rubles went to each of approximatel y 1250 kolkhozes of Moscow province in 1956. It is also
known that some 87,000,000 labor days were credited to the kolkhoz
members of this province during that year, from which it follows
that the value of one "labor day" is rated at approximately 3.70
rubles. If it is then assumed that the average kolkhoz peasant earns
approximately 350 "labor days" per year, his annual cash income
from the collective farm would be in the vicinity of 1300 rubles
per year. ** In addition to this, the same peasant receives 1.22 kilograms of grain per labor day, which makes a total of about 425
kilograms annually. In theory, at least, he may sell this amount on
the collective farm market, but it is most unlikely that he would
do this with all or even most of it since graIn is a staple item of the
Russian diet whose per capita consumption is in the neighborhood
of 250 kilograms per annum. If it is further assumed that not
all the members of a kolkhoz household earn the same number of
"labor days," and indeed that some of them earn none at all, it can
then be safely assumed that most of the grain received is actually
consumed by the peasant and his fa mil y rather than put up for
sale.
Voprosy Ekonomiki} Moscow, Nov. 6, 1956 and Pravda} Moscow, February
2, 1957.
:II:

:11::11: Pravda} February 2, 1957, gives an average of 343 for the Moscow
province.
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TABLE Y.
THE SOVIET LIVESTOCK POPULATION
1917 - 1955

(Within the present boundaries
of the U.S.S.R.)

MILLION HEAD

140
130

SHEEP AND
GOATS

120
110
100

90
80

70

ALL CATTLE

60

50

40

HOGS
COWS

30
20

10

1937
1955
1947
1916
1927
Table IV shows that the total Soviet livestock herd was substantially the same in 1955
(the latest census year) as it had been in 1917. Even more significantly, the figures
reveal that it had been much higher in 1927 than it was in 1955. Hogs alone have
registered a net gain over both J 917 and J 927, but even this advance is far from
commensurate with population growth during the same period of time.
Note I:
Note 2:

Sources:
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1919 data have been adjusted for the present boundar.ies of the
U.S.S.R.
In 1953, the Soviet government shifted the date of its official live·
stock count from January I to October I. Since figures are
available for both dates in the year "1953 it has been possible to
adjust t he 1955 data accordingly by employing the January.October
ratios for 1953. This may, of course, result in a margin of error, buf
a margin which is so small that .it would not significantly alter the
results which are reported in this tabulation.

Narodnoe Khoz;o;styO SSSR , Moscow, 1956

TABLE :iI
THE IMPACT OF SOVIETIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE:
AVERAGE OUTPUT OF SELECTED CROPS IN POLAND
PRE- AND POST-WORLD WAR II
MILLION TONS
~~----------------------------------------------------------

1934-38

GRAIN

POTATOES

SUGAR BEETS

Although the Communist government of Poland achieved some gains under its Six Year
Plan (1950 - 1955 incl.) over the post-war low of 1946-7, it will be seen that grain a.nd
potato production remain well below the level of the 1930's and that the gain in
sugar beet production is ·very modest indeed.
Note:

Source:

Production figures given in this table have been adjusted in the
light of post-war frontier changes.

Rocznilc Statystyczny, Warsaw, 1956
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To place the figure of 1300 rubles in proper perspective a
number of factors must be taken into consideration. The first
of these is that the cost of everyday necessities is quite high. A kilogram of sugar, for instance, which the kolkhoz farmer cannot
grow himself, cost 11 rubles, a kilogram of fresh fish 8 rubles, and a
kilogram of tea no less than 68 rubles in 1956.*
It should also be remembered that, quite apart from semiluxuries like tea, the average kolkhoz member does not automatically receive all basic foodstuffs from the collective farm. Thus,
a grain farm is likely to distribute no meat in return for the peasants' "labor day" units, while a dairy farm will not distribute grain.
In either event, the peasant is compelled to buy a basic item in his
diet, whether it be meat or bread, on the market and for cash. From
whatever is left after these inescapable purchases, he must meet his
tax obligations, buy clothing, and meet the costs of educating his
children before he can even begin to think of spending on manufactured consumer goods. **
No information is available on the actual extent of peasant
earnings resulting from the sale of produce grown on the household plot. There can be little doubt, however, that these vary
considerably even within the relatively narrow limits imposed by
the restricted size of these plots and the fact that, even under
the best of circumstances, the peasant is unlikely to be able to devote full time to the care of his own plot. In any event, it may be
assumed that few if any peasants either can or even wish to sell
all that they are able to grow. Depending on their individual
circumstances, and the specific nature of the kolkhoz in which
they are enrolled, it is more likely that, precisely because of their
'*' Prices from Komsomolskaia Pravda, Moscow, February 22, 1957.
'*' '*' The cash income used in the above calculations and estimates is that

for the year 1956. It is, in other words, the income which ensued after
the enactment of far-reaching reforms which followed Stalin's death in
1953. Prior to that year, the cash income of kolkhoz peasants was about
one sixth of the present amount. Current figures are based on V oprosi
Ekonomiki, Ope cit.
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low income from other sources, they would prefer to supplement
their most basic needs directly from the plot itself. Yet, whatever
his choice actually turns out to be, it is scarcely surprising that
almost every kolkhoz member spends as much time as he can
possibly afford on his private plot. Whether it is money that he
needs, or food, or both, he clearly fails to get enough of them
for his labor on the collective farm.
It will be recalled that this discussion of the results which
socialist agriculture has achieved was undertaken in the light of
two widely accepted criteria appropriate to a judgment of success
and failure in agricultural policy. In the light of our analysis it is
now possible to draw some conclusions.
First, it would appear that the Communist agricultural system
has not succeeded in increasing production adequately to meet
the needs of rising demand. Even in the Soviet Union such progress
as has been registered over a period of 40 years failed to ensure
an adequate food base for the population. In the countries of Eastern
Europe, which theoretically should have benefited from Soviet experience and hence avoided its errors, production has actually
registered a net decline. Even though, as we have said, the agricultures of most of these countries were ravaged by war, it is difficult
to interpret this decline otherwise than by reference to the system
itself-for their industries were also damaged and still have
shown a much more ra pid rate of growth. Nor were the Communist countries the only ones to suffer war damage, and yet the
agricultures of other European countries are at higher levels today
than they were before 1939. It is, therefore, to the political philosophy of Communism and to its economic policies and institutions
that one must turn to understand the roots of agricultural failure
in the Soviet world.
We must also conclude that, apart from production as such,
the Communist system has failed to better the lot of the average
peasant. Even if the Soviet peasant of today is somewhat richer
than his pre-revolutionary ancestors, it must be remembered that
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the Russian peasant was very poorly off indeed before 1917.
As to the peasantry of Eastern Europe, little doubt is possible that
their present lot is materially worse than it was 20 years ago.

The Political Consequences oj Collectivization
It remains to assess the collectivization of agriculture in terms
of the political criteria which Communists themselves are most
likely to apply-to test the results in terms of ideology and the
desire to effect a transformation of society. The characteristic
outlook of the Bolsheviks and their latter day descendants renders
it entirely conceivable that they be ready to admit that the peasant
and agriculture as a whole have suffered over the p::tst four decades,
that these losses had been far outweighed by other and more significant successes. To what extent, one may ask, would this assertion be correct.
It is certainly true that, in the Soviet Union and to a lesser
extent in the People's Democracies, the entire face of the countryside has been transformed. Private ownership of land has been
abolished and the whole nature of peasant life has changed within
a remarkably short period. The cost, as we have seen, has been
enormous, not only to the peasant himself but to the community
at large. Yet more significantly, even in the Soviet Union there is
still no "rural proletariat" and there are no "rural factories." The
peasant has acquiesced, but has not given his support to the new
system. His attachment to the household plot and relative dislike
of the collective farm shows him to be still very far from the
doctrinaire's concept of a "socialist" man.
The peasant's unwillingness, and inability, to accept both the
outward forms and essential implications of socialist agriculture as
understood by contemporary Communists is illustrated even more
dramatically in the People's Democracies. Only Bulgaria has succeeded in expanding the collective land area to include a majority of the arable land. In all the others, collectivization has
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met with the stubbornest possible resistance. In Czechoslovakia,
after a peak 38 per cent of the agricultural land had been collectivized in 1953,* there was a decline of 32 per cent in 1956, despite
the regime's strenuous efforts to prevent an exodus from the
kolkhozes. In Hungary the reversal has been even greater as the
share of arable land in collective farms declined from a peak of
28 per cent in June 1953 to 16 per cent in 1955. After the revolt
of October 1956 the decline was even sharper with the result that,
at the present time, probably less than ten per cent of Hungarian
arable land remains collectivized. In Poland, the Communist regime
never succeeded in incorporating more than ten per cent of the
arable land into the collective sector, a result which was only
achieved after laborious effort in 1953. Yet, even this unimposing
edifice fell like a house of cards following the events which returned Wladislaw Gomulka to power in October 1956. By early
1957 less than two per cent of the land remained in the collective
sector. Finally the Romanian collectivization program, while it
shows none of the fluctuations which characterize those of other
countries, has simply failed to grow at all. By the end of 1956
no more than nine per cent of the arable land had been collectivized
and there are no indications that this situation will change significantly in the foreseeable future.
This is not a picture which is likely to convince the impartial
observer that the Communists have succeeded in effecting either a
deep or lasting change in the hearts and minds of the peasantry. Except in the Soviet Union, they have not even achieved submission.
The peasant of the Communist world has been subjected to every
form of pressure and compulsion, and where he has yielded, he
has done so of necessity and not of conviction. To speak of any
political, psychological, or ideological victory on the Communists'
part is, therefore, no more than an illusion. In the countryside, there
has simply been no movement or inclination to espouse the Marxist

* Agricultural land is a broader concept than arable land and includes forests,
roads, etc. rather than merely cultivable plowland.
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outlook. The kolkhoz and the sovkhoz have been brought into
being, but they remain shells without genuine substance. They are
organizations without a cohesion of their own which, in the final
analysis, can be sustained only by the actual, or implied, use
of force.
Nor have the Communists even succeeded in organizing these
external forms of agriculture to their own satisfaction. Agriculture as it exists in the Soviet Union today, after 40 years of development, is only a compromise structure which satisfies neither the
government nor the peasantry. Its form can hardly satisfy the
ideal Marxist pattern since, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is far
from perfect. It has none of the health traditionally associated with
the hybrid, nor can its frailty be justified on grounds of sheer
production.
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Conclusion

It can be argued that no industrial development takes place
without a measure of sacrifice and that the process has always involved a necessary degree of social dislocation. Similarly, responsible
economists will agree that large-scale investment programs, especiall y when wholly or partially financed from domestic resources,
are likely to result in a temporary reduction in consumption and
in the rate of investment which can be allowed for agriculture.
Let us agree, then, that industrialization-wherever carried out
-requires self-restraint and even abnegation on the part of the
mass of citizens. Yet it is a reasonable, as well as vital, question to
ask how much self-denial need be endured, and for how long a
period of time. It is precisely this question which the Communists
have been unwilling to ask or to answer. It has not been a matter
with them of simply reducing the level of agricultural investment
for a limited period, and thus of suiting the means to the end.
Instead, they have actually diminished the capital s~ock of agriculture. They have not only slowed the rate of growth in that sector
of the economy; wherever they have seized power, and retained it,
there has been an actual and demonstrable retrogression.
The record of Communist agriculture over the last four decades
shows that the Soviets and their satellites have not incurred the
penalties of dislocation in the interest of speedy and efficient reconstruction. Instead, their policies seem to have been designed
to perpetuate and even to institutionalize the dislocation of a
large and vitally important sector of the population.
It would be foolish to question the scientific and industrial gains
of the Soviet Union. Some of them have been truly astonishing and
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of far-reaching importance. But precisely because there is an advanced Soviet technology the careful analyst must ask to what
purpose this technology has been put. Has it advanced general
welfare so that its impact has been felt by the broad masses of the
people? The Soviet Union has, after all, not been the only country
which has made remarkable industrial progress over a relatively
short period of time. Other countries have industrialized and succeeded in doing so without destroying entire sectors of their
economies. As a model for other nations, therefore, the Soviet
system is found wanting-unless it be admitted that sheer military
and industrial power, unrelated to national welfare, are desirable
ends in themselves.
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, there is the matter
of human cost. To what extent can it be said that it has "worked,"
if it continues to run counter to the inclinations and predilections
of a large proportion of the population and if it can only be sustained by force?
The Government and Party of the Soviet Union and of the PeopIe's Democracies claim to represent the working class. They claim
to speak for the "toiling masses" and to be working for their
best interests. Yet it is vital to remember that the peasant too is
a member of the "toiling masses"; in fact, the tillers of the soil are
still a majority of the population in the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and China. To offer privilege and plenty to an elite of scientists, engineers, and state functionaries is easy. The least progressive and most exploitative of the world's societies have done as much
for their own elites. The true test of progress-and incidentally of
democracy-must be based on different criteria. It must show that
just as much has been done for the citizen at large, both in
the city and the countryside, for the humble as well as the exalted,
for the unskilled as well as the skilled.
N either the Soviet Union nor the other Communist states can
pass this test. All of them have failed in their obligation to the
peasant, and by virtue of that failure, to the rest of their peoples
as well.
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